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A LESSOR'S OBJECTION TO
ASSIGNMENT OF THE LEASE BY THE
LESSEE: ISRAELI LAW IN THE LIGHT
OF THE COMMON LAW
Shalom Lerner*
I. INTRODUCTION
In principle, a lessee may enter into various transactions
with the right to lease, such as an assignment or a sublease.'
This Article examines whether, and under what conditions, the
lessee is permitted to effect these transactions.
On this issue, contradictory considerations come into play.
On the one hand, the lessee should be allowed to enter into vari-
ous transactions concerning the leased property since he holds
the right of possession and of use during the period of the lease.
On the other hand, the lessor - the actual owner of the prop-
erty - may be affected by the assignment of rights to another.
The lessor who originally enters into an agreement with an ac-
ceptable lessee, may be left with a different contractual partner
or possessor of the property after such an assignment.
The lessee's power to assign rights does not stem from the
general approach of the legal system to the nature of a lease.
Indeed, a property-oriented approach advocates the potential
assignment of the lessee's rights, but this conclusion is the hand-
maiden of the law and not its master. First, the ruling is made
* Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, Bar Ilan University, Israel.
1. The distinction between sublease and assignment of the lease is recognized in the
Common law. See H. LEsAR, LANDLORD AND TENANT 297-300 (1957) [hereinafter H.
LESAR]. In an assignment the transferee comes into privity of estate with the lessor so
that both are liable to the other on covenants running with the land. Furthermore, the
lessee is not the landlord of the transferee. However, in a sublease, the original lessee
becomes the landlord of the transferee. Moreover, they may not, under the common law
sue each other directly upon covenants in the lease. Id. See also R. SCHOSHINSKI, AMERI-
CAN LAW OF LANDLORD AND TENANT 555-59 (1980) [hereinafter R. SCHOSHINSKI]. Israeli
law distinguishes, in addition, between assignment of the entire rental agreement and
assignment of the rights of the lessee. In the case of assignment of the agreement, the
lessee is completely released from his obligations, and the assignee replaces him in all
that concerns the contract. See Hacker v. Barash, C.A. 208/51, 8 P.D. 566-70. Common
law does not recognize anything similar, and even after the assignment, the original
lessee has privity of contract with the lessor.
In this Article, the term "assignment of lease" includes the three transactions (sub-
lease, assignment of the entire rental agreement, and assignment of the rights of the
lessee), unless otherwise implied by the context.
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concerning the assignment of the lease, and later, in view, inter
alia, of this ruling, the classification of a lease is made in that
legal system.
There are various options for balancing the opposing inter-
ests regarding the assignment of rights in a lease. Detailed legis-
lation which sets forth precise rules and standards for distin-
guishing between permissible and nonpermissible assignments is
one option. Such legislation should take into account the dis-
tinction between long-term and short-term leases,2 between
leases of furnished rather than nonfurnished property," and be-
tween an assignment and a sublease. In a long-term lease, for
example, the personal element is relatively marginal since the
lessor is aware of the possibility that the lessee may not remain
on the property for the duration of the period. In contrast, the
lessor has a greater interest in the particular person who leases a
furnished apartment as that lessee will use the lessor's furniture.
With respect to an assignment of the lease, the assignee is the
only obligee of the lessor with respect to the rent,4 and financial
dependability is therefore of utmost importance. In a sublease,
however, the original lessee remains the lessor's contractual
partner. Therefore the sublessee's financial standing is not of
equal importance. Similarly, it is possible to distinguish between
a regular lease and a "percentage" lease in which the rent
changes to reflect the lessee's business cycle. In this situation,
there is a tendency to accept the lessor's objections to assigning
the management of the business to a party other than the origi-
nal lessee. 5
II. HIRE AND LOAN LAW, 19716
The Israeli legislature refrained from being overly detailed
in the formulation of the Hire and Loan Law, 1971 (Hire Law).
2. For a similar distinction in Scotland, see G. PATON & J. CAMERON, 4 THE LAW OF
LANDLORD AND TENANT IN SCOTLAND 65-73 (Aberdeen 1967).
3. See In Swedish Law, 2 AN INTRODUCTION To SWEDISH 389 (S. Stromholm, ed.
1981).
4. This is so in the case of assignment of the entire contract. See supra note 1.
5. See H. LESAR, supra note 1, at 295-96. In American common law there is no right
to transfer the lease when the lessor's compensation relies on the skill and competence of
the lessee. This would be the case in the common percentage lease. This is grounded in
the notion that such a lease is based on a relation of trust and confidence between the
lessor and the original lessee. Id.
6. Hire and Loan Law, chapter A, section E., S.H. 180 (1971) [hereinafter Hire
Law].
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One criterion was laid down for the different forms of hire or
lease. Because of the importance of the provisions of section 22
of the Hire Law, the entire section is reprinted below:'
The lessee shall not without consent of the lessor transfer his
right to possess and use the thing hired to another or sublet
such thing. Provided that if the lessor does not consent to the
transaction on unreasonable grounds, or attaches unreasonable
conditions to his consent, then -
(1)in the case of immovable property - the lessee may
effect the transaction without the consent of the lessor;
(2)in the case of any hire - the Court may authorise the
transaction on such conditions as it may see fit; in the
case of a hire of immovable property, the Court may do so
notwithstanding anything provided in the contract of
hire.
In this section, there are two points of intersection: between
immovable and movable property, and between a contract re-
stricting assignability and one which contains no such restric-
tion. Accordingly, when the lessor objects unreasonably to as-
signment, there is a double distinction between movable and
immovable property. First, when the rental agreement does not
limit assignability, the lessee is entitled to assign the leased im-
movable property without the prior consent of the court. In the
case of movable property, the lessee may act only after the court
has given its consent. Second, when the rental agreement pro-
hibits the lessee from assigning his right, the prohibition is abso-
lute as regards movable property, but the court may still allow
the assignment of immovable property.
This section of the Hire Law places clear restraints on the
lessee's power to assign a lease. The submission of a potential
lease assignment to the court results in delays that may preclude
the lessee from assigning rights in the leased property to certain
assignees. In addition, the court is authorized to impose "condi-
tions as it may see fit" on the implementation of the transaction
including compensation for the lessor.7
Section 22 of the Hire'Law changes the legal posture that
existed in Israel during the period of the Mejelle,8 both with re-
7. Cf. Tenant Protection Law (Consolidated Version) § 37(b) (1972).
8. The Ottoman civil law was embodied in the "Mejelle," a code containing 1,851
articles written in Turkish. The substantive part of the Mejelle is arranged in 16 books
concerning specific subjects such as sales, hire, guarantee, transfer of debts, pledges,
trusts, agency, and evidence among others. The Mejelle was repealed in Turkey more
1991]
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spect to the assignment of the lease and with respect to the sub-
lease. In the absence of an agreement to the contrary, section
587 of the Mejelle stipulated that the lessee could sublet the
property, but the court was not authorized to allow such a sub-
lease if it was contrary to the provisions of the original lease.,
On the other hand, a lessee was not permitted to assign a lease10
unless the agreement with the lessor specifically allowed such a
transaction.
The following section examines two central questions that
arise from a reading of the Hire Law: (1) what is the criterion for
testing the "reasonableness" of the lessor's objection to the as-
signment, and (2) why did the legislature intervene in the free-
dom of contract by permitting assignment contrary to the provi-
sions of the original agreement between the lessor and the
lessee? Before discussing these questions, it is important to note
that the starting point in section 22 of the Hire Law is that a
lease should not be assigned without the lessor's consent. From
this conclusion stems the opinion that the lessee must first ap-
proach the lessor and seek consent to a sublease, even if the
lessee believes that the lessor has no good reason for opposing
the assignment.1 The request must include various details about
the proposed assignee, and the lessor must be given a reasonable
period of time in which to formulate a position.12 The burden of
proof falls on the lessee who must prove that any of the lessor's
objections to the assignment are grounded on unreasonable
considerations. 3
than 60 years ago. In Israel, portions of the Mejelle continued in force until 1984 when
the code was repealed.
9. This is the rule, in general, in the Common law. See R. SCHOSHINSKI, supra note
1, at 553. On the tendency in the United States toward the criterion of reasonableness,
see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY (LANDLORD AND TENANT) § 15.2 n.7 (1977)
[hereinafter RESTATEMENT (SECOND)]; Johnson, Correctly Interpreting Long-term Leases
Pursuant to Modern Contract Law: Toward a Theory of Relational Leases, 74 VA. L.
REV. 751 (1988) [hereinafter Johnson]. In England, if it has been stipulated in the con-
tract that the lessee will not be permitted to effect transactions without the consent of
the lessor, the lessor will not be permitted to withhold his consent unreasonably. See
HILL & REDMAN, LANDLORD AND TENANT para. A 2600, n.1 (18th ed. 1987) [hereinafter
HILL & REDMAN].
10. See Hacker v. Barash, C.A. 208/51, 8 P.D. 566.
11. For a discussion on the interpretation of a term in a contract stipulating that the
consent of the lessor will not be withheld unreasonably, see F.H. 20/62 Meiri v. Morri,
17(2) P.D. 1236, 1241.
12. W. COOPER, SOUTH AFRICAN LAW OF LANDLORD AND TENANT 227 (1973).
13. See Hakhsharat Hayishuv Leyisrael Co. v. State of Israel, C.A. 335/67, 22(2)
P.D. 365, 367.
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III. TESTING WHETHER THE LESSOR'S OBJECTION IS REASONABLE
Section 22 of the Hire Law, reprinted above, sets forth the
general principle that the lessor should not be allowed to object
to the assignment unreasonably. The legislature left the details
to be fleshed out by the courts. The following section examines
the various options left open to the courts. In principle, this Ar-
ticle posits that the required degree of reasonableness enabling
the lessor to reject a particular assignment by the lessee must be
defined as precisely as possible to help the lessee assess the les-
sor's motives. As discussed above, where a rental agreement does
not limit assignments, the lessee does not need judicial consent
and is permitted to rent out the immovable property despite the
lessor's objection, if the lessee believes such objections are un-
reasonable. It follows that the discretion given to the lessee must
be accompanied by the creation of clear tools to help formulate
the decision to sublease.
In testing the reasonableness of the grounds of objection, a
number of approaches may be adopted. According to a narrow
approach, a lessor's refusal to consent to a sublease will be
deemed reasonable only if it is related to the proposed assignee's
personality, financial credibility or planned use of the prop-
erty.14 This approach is "objective" because it does not take into
account the personality of the lessor. Under this approach, a les-
sor will be entitled to object to an assignee whose previous con-
duct as a tenant has been fraught with problems, who has few
financial means or who is known as someone who does not fulfil
obligations. In this framework, the objection to the assignment
of a rented apartment may be considered reasonable if the fam-
ily of the assignee is larger than that of the original lessee,15 or if
the planned use by the assignee of commercial property might
depress its value. In contrast, an objection will not be deemed
reasonable if it is unrelated to the person of the assignee but
rather stems from the lessor's desire to exploit the assignment
for personal gain, such as raising the rent, or imposing addi-
tional restrictions on the use of the property.16
14. Cf. Note, Effect of Leasehold Provisions Requiring the Lessor's Consent to As-
signment, 21 HASTINGS L.J. 516 (1970).
15. This example and its predecessors are to be found in Model Residential Land-
lord-Tenant Code § 2-403 (1969).
16. Cf. Johnson, supra note 9, at 758-60. According to this opinion, the lessor will
not be permitted to object to the proposed assignee because of the latter's occupation
constituting competition with his own. For a discussion, see R. SCHOSHINSKI, supra note
1991]
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Based on this approach, a lessor would not be entitled to
object to the assignee for reasons of the latter's religion or ideol-
ogy. Such objection would be "subjective," stemming from the
views of the particular lessor. This issue arose in the United
States when a lessor with certain religious views from the
Yeshiva University in New York objected to a particular as-
signee because the latter was involved in family planning.17 The
court ruled that such an objection was unreasonable, since it was
neither related to the conduct of the assignee as a lessee nor
with the proposed use of the property." However, it is doubtful
whether an Israeli court would arrive at the same conclusion. In
Israel, the court is not authorized to force a person who wishes
to rent property, to rent it to an ideological opponent.1 9 An
owner may choose to rent or not rent property to whomever he
wishes. It therefore makes no sense that by means of an assign-
ment, the owner could be subjected to a transaction that could
not be achieved directly through the original lease.
Under another, more flexible approach, a lessor is entitled
to object to assignment as long as the reasons are "fair, genuine
and reasonable."2 0 Accordingly, grounds for objection should not
be limited in advance, and the court should be left with wide
discretion. In reaching a decision, the court should be allowed to
take into account all the circumstances of the lease, not just the
personality of the assignee.
One Israeli court rejected the narrow approach and adopted
the more flexible framework.2 In the course of its decision, the
court ruled that an objection will not be considered reasonable if
the lessor takes refuge in an unclear reason, or if the true pur-
pose of the objection to the assignment is to terminate the prin-
ciple lease. In light of this ruling, it is clear that the gap between
the two approaches is not wide, and in most cases, an objection
will be deemed reasonable and fair only if it is related to the
1, at 581-82.
17. American Book Co. v. Yeshiva University Dev. Found., 297 N.Y.S.2d 156 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1969).
18. Id. at 161.
19. In the United States, the courts tend to fight against discrimination already at
the stage of the original lease. See American Book Co., 297 N.Y.S.2d at 161. See gener-
ally RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 9, at § 3.1.
20. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 9, at loc. cit. See also CHESHIRE AND
BURN'S MODERN LAW OF REAL PROPERTY (13th ed. 1982).
21. Hakhsharat Hayishuv Leyisrael Co. v. State of Israel, C.A. 335/67, 22(2) P.D.
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personality of the assignee and the proposed use of the prop-
erty.22 It should also be noted that the court's decision preceded
the Hire Law, and dealt with a contract that stipulated that the
lessor would not object unreasonably to an assignment. The Hire
Law currently lays down a similar policy, and as discussed
above, clear and unequivocal criteria should be adopted in addi-
tion to according discretion to the lessee. An approach that ac-
cords discretion to the lessee, and sets forth clear and unequivo-
cal criteria should be adopted.
The cases post-dating the enactment of the Hire Law have
only dealt with the question of reasonable grounds for objection
- in connection with the long-term lease of immovable property
owned by the Israel Lands Administration. In these agree-
ments, which are of great importance in the Israeli context, the
lessee undertakes to pay the Israel Lands Administration upon
assignment of the lease, one-third of the increased value of the
land. In other words, the payment equals one-third of the differ-
ence between the value of the land at the time the lease agree-
ment was made and its value at the time of the assignment.2 "
An express agreement to make such payments, called "con-
sent fees," does not give rise to many problems.2 5 The Israeli
court, however, has ruled that if the contract prohibits the lessee
from assigning rights without the lessor's consent, and if the les-
sor is allowed under the agreement to object on reasonable
grounds to the assignment, then the lessor is entitled to a rea-
sonable proportion of the profits stemming from the apprecia-
tion in value of the property.26 In other words, the right to "con-
22. On the issue of what is reasonable, many questions have still to be decided. For
example, is it possible to take into account the damage that will be caused to the lessee
as a result of the withholding of consent? See Keren Kayemet Leyisrael v. Savizki, C.A.
840/75, 30(3) P.D. 540. For a recent decision in England on this subject, see International
Drilling Fluids, Ltd. v. Louisville Invs. (Uxbridge) Ltd., 1 All E.R. 321 (1986).
23. In Israel, most of the land is owned by the State, and is leased to the people
through a body known as the Israel Lands Administration, by means of 90 year leases.
See Hacker v. Barash, C.A. 208/51, 8 P.D. 566-70.
24. The decisions of the Israel Lands Administration Council on this matter ap-
peared in the Official Gazette no. 2844 of 26.8.82. In lease agreements relating to land
leased, for the first time, after 1975,."consent fees" are capitalized in advance and are
paid to the Israel Lands Administration at the time that the first agreement is made.
25. The main question which occupied the courts in recent years is whether, in cal-
culating the rise in value of the land, inflationary price rises must be taken into consider-
ation. For a discussion of the different approaches here, see Amar v. Israel Lands Ad-
min., C.A. 118/83, 39(1) P.D. 693; Bobilski v. Israel Lands Admin., C.A. 605/82, 39(3)
P.D. 130.
26. Weirauch v. Israel Lands Admin., C.A. 585/68, 23(1) P.D. 491. This decision was
1991] 299
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sent fees" exists in this instance even if there was no express
agreement to this effect in the lease agreement. In this context,
the court decided that the lessor's demand to receive one third
of the rise in value of the land was reasonable and fair. If the
Israel Lands Administration were to demand exaggerated sums,
however, the court would intervene under the authority granted
by section 22 of the Hire Law. This position finds expression in
the unequivocal language of Judge Witkon:
Regarding a rented or leased property which, because of the
rise in value of the land, has been sold at a profit - both law
and equity require that not only should the lessee enjoy such
profit, but the owner as well. The latter, too, has a legitimate
interest in being a partner to the appreciation of his property. 28
The court deems participation in the profits of the lessee at
the time the rented property is assigned to be just and fair. This
conclusion is somewhat surprising. In actual fact, the rise in
value of the leased property does not occur because of the as-
signment but merely finds expression at that time. Nevertheless,
the lessor would not be entitled to share in the appreciation of
the land if the lessee did not assign the lease since the contract
did not provide for such an apportionment. In other words, the
lessor exploits the fact that his consent is required for assign-
ment to obtain advantages not directly connected to the assign-
ment. This result expresses - though perhaps inadvertently -
a trend in the case law allowing long-term contracts to adapt to
changing circumstances. It is difficult for parties to foresee fu-
ture circumstances when they enter into a contract. Therefore,
this approach permits one of the parties to take advantage of an
opportunity that arises - such as assignment of the lease - to
adapt the contract to the new circumstances. This view, how-
ever, is unacceptable because it is possible for the parties to a
contract to include various mechanisms for making future adap-
tations such as renegotiating the rent from time to time. A con-
tract provision addressing future modifications is preferable to
exploiting unforeseen events that arise unexpectedly.
issued prior to the passage of the Hire Law, and at that time, if the contract prohibited
assignment, the lessor was permitted to withhold his consent, even if his reasons were
arbitrary, and he could make his consent contingent upon the payment of substantial
sums. In particular, see the opinion of Judge Landau.
27. Keren Kayemet Leyisrael v. Savizki, C.A. 840/75, 30(3) P.D. 540.
28. Weirauch, C.A. 585/68, 23(1) P.D. at 493.
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As discussed above, this Article supports the narrow view
which advocates setting forth clear criteria for testing the rea-
sonableness of the lessor's objections to assignment. Just as the
lessor is not permitted to add new restrictions on the use of the
property, or to raise the rent at the time of assignment (even if
such actions would be reasonable under current conditions), the
lessor should not be entitled to benefit from the rise in value of
the land. The lessor who does not secure this right in the con-
tract with the lessee must suffer the consequences for the omis-
sion. For this reason, an obligation to pay "consent fees" which
is not anchored in a lease agreement constitutes a tax,29 which a
public authority may be authorized to impose but which has ab-
solutely nothing to do with the rights of the Israel Lands Ad-
ministration as a lessor.
IV. LIMITATIONS ON ASSIGNABILITY AND THE FREEDOM OF
CONTRACT
As discussed above, section 22 of the Hire Law permits a
court to allow the lessee to assign a lease of immovable property,
contrary to the provisions of the contract if the lessor objects on
unreasonable grounds. The following discussion examines why
the Israeli legislature chose to intervene in the freedom of con-
tract and took an unfavorable view on limitations on the assign-
ment of a lease. The express reference to these limitations is es-
pecially apparent considering the legislature's silence on the
whole issue of limitations on assignability of property.30
A negative attitude to limitations on assignability need not
manifest itself in legislative intervention in the freedom of con-
tract. Rather, it is possible to restrict the scope of limitations by
means of judicial interpretation. This is the only way open to
courts that have not been authorized to directly invalidate limi-
tations, such as the courts in Israel at the time of the Mejelle, or
under Common law. 31 Limitations on assignability of leases have
been interpreted narrowly, in favor of lessees, to prevent a for-
feiture of the lease because of a breach.2 Thus courts have de-
29. For a discussion on viewing "consent fees" as a tax, see id. at 494.
30. See generally J. WEISMAN, LAND LAW 1969: TRENDS AND ACHIEVEMENTS 49
(1969).
31. But see supra note 9.
32. See Bollos v. Mayor of Nazareth, C.A. 420/63, 18(1) P.D. 443. A similar ap-
proach was adopted with respect to unprotected tenancy. See Tobis v. Rabelski, C.A. 60/
53, 9(1) P.D. 681. For a discussion of narrow interpretation against the lessor, see R.
1991]
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cided that a limitation on assignment does not apply to a sub-
lease,3 3 or to assignment by virtue of the law;3 4 that a
prohibition on assignment and sublease does not prevent an-
other person from merely using the property, 5 and that a prohi-
bition on "transferring the use of property to another" does not
apply to a license to use the property when no transfer of pos-
session is involved.36 These decisions have led, inter alia, to in-
creased licensing as the court has ruled on several occasions that
a prohibition on subleasing does not preclude the grant of a li-
cense. 31 The court has also ruled that a prohibition on assign-
ment is not violated by assigning from a registered partnership
to one of the partners, s or by transferring the ownership of the
shares of the lessee company.39 However, the court's power of
interpretation is not infinite, and experienced lessors have man-
aged to overcome these interpretative devices. Various contracts
have laid down broad limitations which barely allow the lessee
to put up relatives - even temporarily - on the property.40 As
already stated, section 22 adopted a different approach and au-
thorized the court to ignore a limitation if the objection of the
lessor cannot stand the test of reasonableness.
In the last century, the importance of the principle of free-
dom of contract has waned.41 It appears, however, that this prin-
ciple must still be adhered to, unless intervention in the contrac-
tual relationship serves important social purposes or legal
principles. The following discussion attempts to discover the
aims of the legislature: why decisive weight was attributed to the
SCHOSHINSKI, supra note 1, at 583-84.
33. An agreement to limit the assignability of a leasehold is a restraint on alienation.
As such it is subject to the doctrine of strict construction. Therefore a covenant not to
assign does not prevent the lessee from subleasing the leasehold, H. LESAR, supra note 1,
at 301.
34. See HILL & REDMAN, supra note 9, at A 2563.
35. See Tissauer v. Melman, C.A. 645/78, 34(1) P.D. 375.
36. See Tobis, C.A. 60/53, 9(1) P.D. 681.
37. See Weisman, On the Distinction Between Lease of Land and License, 20
HAPRAKLIT 40, 43 (1964).
38. See Humpert v. Konigshoffer, C.A. 148/63, 18(1) P.D. 73. Of course, the parties
may expressly prohibit such an assignment. See, e.g., Hanaovich v. Levinholz, C.A. 220/
54, 9(3) P.D. 1901.
39. See R. SCHOSHINSIU, supra note 1, at 586. However, assignment from a lessee to
a company he controls is deemed to be assignment to another because of the separate
legal identity of the company. See Tissauer, C.A. 645/78, 34(1) P.D. 375.
40. See, e.g., Nagar v. Marcus, C.A. 802/75, 30(3) P.D. 29.
41. See generally Shalev, What Remains of the Freedom of Contract, 17 MISHPATIM
465 (1988).
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reasonableness of the objection to an assignment, and why the
lessor is not allowed to object for arbitrary reasons to the assign-
ment even if the right to do so is secured in the contract. This
Article analyzes briefly three possible justifications: consumer
protection, the principle of good faith, and the public interest in
efficient use of property.
In general, the lessor has the upper hand in the contract,
and can dictate various conditions to the lessee. In such in-
stances, the lessee's agreement to limit assignability is not ob-
tained from equal bargaining power, and therefore the court
may subject the lease to the test of reasonableness.
However, a careful analysis of section 22 reveals that the
statute is not concerned with consumerism. The protection af-
forded by the section extends to all lessees, not just those who
rent property for personal or domestic use.42 A provision which
is truly consumer oriented would not apply to all property, but
only to property which is important from the consumer's per-
spective, such as an apartment or a car. The conclusion that the
statute is not concerned primarily with consumer affairs also
arises from the placement of the section within the Hire Law.
The Israeli legislature enacts special laws for consumer affairs
and does not insert consumer-related provisions into general
laws. For example, the problems created by the imbalance be-
tween the supplier and the customer are dealt with in the Stan-
dard Contracts Law, 1982 and in the Consumer Protection Law,
1981. On the other hand, the general laws, such as the Sale Law
and the Hire and Loan Law, assume parity between the parties
to a contract.43 Thus it is clear that legislative intervention in
limitations on assignability of a lease does not reflect a trend of
consumer protectionism.
Another possible explanation for the legislature's decision to
intervene in the freedom of contract is that arbitrary and capri-
cious refusal on the part of the lessor to the assignment of the
lease is not compatible with the obligation to fulfill the contrac-
tual commitments in good faith." In other words, the provisions
of section 22 of the Hire Law are derived from the general obli-
gation to act in good faith, and as a meta-principle, good faith
42. For the definition of "consumer," see Consumer Protection Law, § 1, 1981.
43. For a discussion on sale, see generally E. ZAMIR, SALE LAW 1968 65-66 (1987).
44. See N. COHEN, CAUSING THE VIOLATION OF A CONTRACT (THE LAW OF TORTS -
THE VARIOUS CIVIL WRONGS) 218, n.39 (G. Tedeschi ed., Harry Sacher Institute for Leg-
islative Research and Comparative Law, 1986); Johnson, supra note 9, at 767.
1991]
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prevails over the principle of freedom of contract.
At first glance, this explanation seems satisfactory, but in
the opinion of this author, it is not in keeping with section 22 of
the Hire Law. In fact, the issue is more general: whether an ob-
stinate and capricious insistence on the fulfillment of a contract
negates the obligation to act in good faith. The legislature has
not expressed an opinion on this question elsewhere, nor has the
case law adopted an unequivocal position on the issue.4" In this
light, the claim that legislative opinion is clear and unequivocal
precisely in this context of assignment of lease, is far from
unassailable.
The conclusion that the policy reflected in section 22 is not
engendered by the obligation to act in good faith becomes even
firmer in the light of a comparison with another provision in the
Hire Law. The Hire Law does not authorize the court to permit
use of the property by the lessee when such use is prohibited by
the contract, even if no damage is caused to the lessor and the
objection in unreasonable." If arbitrary insistence on the fulfill-
ment of the contract is contrary to the obligation to act in good
faith, the result must be identical in both instances. Neither is
the obligation to act in good faith compatible with the fact that,
in relation to movable property, the limitation is totally valid.
Examining the distinction in the Hire Law between movable
and immovable property is of assistance in understanding the
policy behind the provision. Land is a special type of property,
"the quantity of this product on the market is limited, and tak-
ing it out of circulation must therefore be prevented, insofar as
possible. '47 According to this view, the good of the public re-
quires that limitations on the assignability of land not be ac-
corded validity, since these limitations lead to nonexploitation of
the property. As discussed above, the public has an interest in
exploiting land which is limited in quantity. The legislature
therefore allows the lessee who is not interested in using the
rented land to be released from the lease obligation, and to as-
45. See, e.g., Pizanti v. Bezek Co., C.A. 147/85, 41(3) P.D. 74, 78; Ludait Ltd. v.
Shirliv Invs. Ltd., C.A. 795/86, 41(3) P.D. 645, 649.
46. See Hire Law, supra note 6, at § 16. The position of the legislator in relation to
protected tenancy is different. See Tenant Protection Law (Consolidated Version) 1972,
§ 37(a)(1).
47. Weisman, Long-Term Leases Viewed Through a Mortgage Transaction, 7
MISHPATIM 84, 96 (1976). The author provides another reason, according to which "in the
lease of land, the personality of the lessee is not as important a factor as it is liable to be
with respect to other property." Id.
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sign the land to another who almost certainly will use the prop-
erty efficiently.
In principle, there is no doubt that the freedom of contract
may take second place to the public good. However, the assump-
tion that validating a limitation on assignability leads to a lack
of exploitation of land is not unassailable. In actual fact, the
lessee who does not wish to, or cannot, utilize the land has four
options:
(1)to assign the lease to another;
(2)to come to an agreement with the lessor concerning termina-
tion of the lease;
(3)to leave the property unutilized and to continue paying rent;
(4)to breach the obligation to pay rent and to abandon the
property.
Assuming that the contract bars the lessee from assigning
his rights and that the restriction is totally valid, the lessee is
left with only three options. It is reasonable to assume that a
lessee who cannot assign the lease will first suggest to the lessor
to take back the property, thereby agreeing to terminate the
lease. In a rising market, where the lessor can get a higher rent
from a new lessee, there is no good reason for the lessor to reject
the proposal. However, even if the lessee did not propose a mu-
tual cancellation of the agreement, or the lessor refused such a
proposal, it is still better, from the lessee's point of view, to vio-
late the agreement unilaterally, cease paying rent, and abandon
the property. In a legal system such as Israel's, which imposes an
obligation on the lessor to mitigate the damage caused by the
lessee,48 this option is preferable to a continuation in payment of
the rent, despite the nonutilization of the property. With the
abandonment of the property, the lessee will be exempt from
payment of the balance of the rent, or a part thereof, to the ex-
tent that the lessor could have mitigated his damage by finding
another lessee. As discussed above, the initial assumption was
that a new lessee could be found, but the lessee would be unable
to assign the lease because of a limitation stipulated in the con-
48. Under section 23 of the Hire Law, all the provisions of the Contracts (Remedies
for Breach of Contract) Law, 1970, apply to a rental agreement, including the rule of
mitigating the damage (sec. 14 of that Law). For a discussion of this issue in the Com-
mon law and on the recent developments in that system, see Weissenberger, The Land-
lord's Duty to Mitigate Damages on the Tenant Abandonment: A Survey of Old Law
and New Trends, 53 TaMp. L. E L.Q. 1 (1980).
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tract. In order to prevent losses, a reasonable lessor will lease the
land to another party, leaving no cause for concern that the land
will not be utilized. Indeed, one of the reasons for applying the
doctrine of mitigating damages with respect to the lease of land
is raising the productivity of the property.
In other words, the limitation or nonlimitation of assignabil-
ity has no effect on the utilization of the land. Because of the
rule concerning mitigation of damages, there is no danger that
the land will remain unutilized, and that it will not be rented
out to someone else.4 9 The only result of the limitation of assign-
ability is that the lessor, rather than the lessee, will select the
new lessee. There is no apparent reason to intervene in such an
agreement and to deprive the lessor of this advantage.
In fact, in only rare cases will the objection of the lessor be
truly capricious and irrational. In most cases, the purpose of the
objection is to obtain economic advantage. When there has been
a drop in rent in the market, the lessor will be interested in a
continuation of the rental bond, either with the original lessee or
with the assignee, and will not have an interest in regaining pos-
session of the land. When the market price for rentals is higher
than the rent being paid under the contract, the lessor will be
interested in enforcing the restriction on assignability to take
advantage of this increase and not to allow the lessee to pocket
all the profits. It is interesting to note that according to the ap-
proach manifested in Israeli case law, as described above, the
lessor may be awarded a significant proportion of the price in-
crease, even if the court intervenes in the agreement and allows
the lessor to object to assignment on reasonable grounds only. In
other words, if the limitation on assignability is accorded full va-
lidity, the lessor will get the benefit of the full rise in the value
of the rented property. In contrast, the policy expressed in sec-
tion 22 of the Hire Law will accord the lessor only partial advan-
tage from the price increase.
V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
According to the Hire Law, a lease of land may not be as-
signed, nor may the land be sublet, without the consent of the
lessor, but if the lessor objects to the transaction on grounds
which are not reasonable, the transaction may be effected, albeit
49. For a discussion on the connection between mitigation of damages and sublease,
see 1 Milton R. FRIEDMAN, LEASEs 226-27, 258 (2d ed. 1983).
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contrary to the stipulations of the agreement of lease.
This Article discussed two major difficulties, the first theo-
retical and the second practical, posed by this system. In our
view, intervention in the freedom of contract does not serve a
clear interest, and is therefore unjustified. The practical diffi-
culty is that the law allows the lessor to object to the transaction
on "reasonable grounds," an unwieldy term that cannot be de-
fined easily.
It appears that there was nothing to stop the legislature
from choosing another path. It would have been possible to leg-
islate that in the absence of a limitation in the rental agreement,
the lessee would be permitted to assign the lease or to sublet
without the consent of the lessor and that any contractual limi-
tation would be totally valid. This position is compatible with
the proprietary nature of the lease, while taking into considera-
tion the principle of freedom of contract as long as public order
is maintained. This is the prevailing Common law position, and
was the law pertaining to subleases in Israel at the time of the
Mejelle. This approach also constitutes the law pertaining to the
making of a mortgage or an easement by the lessee.5 0 In conclu-
sion, such a framework is not alien even to the current
legislature.
Israeli law takes the position that the lessor who demands
of the lessee who vacates the premises the balance of the rent
due, must mitigate damages and search for an alternative lessee.
Such a system leaves no concern that the property will remain
unutilized economically, and particularly not as a result of ac-
cording full force to a limitation on assignability. The concern
that lessors will insist on similar limitations as a matter of
course and that the lessee will hold none of the bargaining power
should be dealt with in special consumer protection laws, as en-
acted legislatively with respect to other transactions, rather than
by a sweeping provision in the Hire Law.
Apparently, according to this author's proposal, the law af-
fords unjustifiable protection to the lessor's arbitrary objection
to assignment. It must not be forgotten, however, that on the
other side stands the principle of the freedom of contract, and
the limitation is the fruit of voluntary negotiations and agree-
ment between equal parties. Does arbitrary insistence on fulfill-
ment of the contract contradict the obligation to act in good
50. Land Law, sec. 81.
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faith? This view has not yet taken root in the general law of
contracts. There is no justification for adopting an unbending
position on the issue of the assignability of a lease.
